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In summary, this may be ventured in respect to the right
of the beneficiary to sue in Montana. The incidental beneficiary
has no cause of action against the promisor. The creditor bene-
ficiary is allowed a direct right except in the case of a grantee
assuming a mortgage debt. Although there are no general pro-
nouncements by our Court that the donee beneficiary has a di-
rect suit against the promisor, and in spite of the language in
early decisions and that of Martin v. American Surety Co., it is
believed that the Supreme Court of Montana is substantially
committed to the doctrine that the donee beneficiary has a di-
rect suit against the promisor. The donee beneficiary cases
passed upon by the Supreme Court have involved "sole" bene-
ficiaries of insurance policies; sub-contractors, laborers and ma-
terialmen under provisions of a surety bond; and cases of prom-
ises for the benefit of a child. Though there may be historical
reason, there is no logical reason for preferring these to other
donee beneficiaries. The language of the code is broad enough
to permit recovery by any donee beneficiary. In view of the
progress already made, the expectation seems warranted that,
as occasion arises, other types of donee beneficiaries will be per-
mitted a direct suit, in line with the growth of the law elsewhere
in America.
-Carl Burgess.
CORPORATIONS: LIMITATIONS UPON THE RIGHT OF
A STOCKHOLDER TO BRING A REPRESENTATIVE
SUIT IN MONTANA
Does the complaining stockholder always have to petition
the other stockholders for redress as a condition of his right to
bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation? Such
seems to be the conclusion of a recent A. L. R. Annotation,1
and at least one Montana case, which goes so far as to say that
'Annotation in 72 A. L. R. 621 to Caldwell v. Eubanks (1930) 326 Mo.
185, 30 S. W. (2d) 976. The annotator apparently concludes that there
are only two situations in which application to the stockholders as a
body will be excused: one is where the majority stockholders were in
league with the wrongdoers, and the other where there is shown lack
of time. In support of this proposition he cites every imaginable case
on the subject, but it is contended and sought to be shown in this ar-
ticle that his theory is not supported by the better authority, and that
it is subject to the same criticism as Is herein made of the dictum in
Allen v. Montana Refining Co. (1924) 71 Mont. 105, 227 P. 582. Rather,
it would be more commensurate with sound policy to adhere to the
rule as set out in Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont (1912) 206
N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112 and the exhaustive anno-
tation thereto.
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the complainant must first ask the majority stockholders to
elect a new board of directors before he may institute a suit
himself.'
The answer to the question posed cannot readily be put
in one all inclusive statement usable for every possible situa-
tion. This is borne out by the wide variety of results which
have been obtained in the many derivative suits which have
been brought in the Montana court,' as well as those in other
jurisdictions,' and the several attempts by the text writers to
state a workable doctrine, which tend for the most part to be
as conflicting as the decisions."
It must be remembered that the existence of a right to
bring a derivative suit at all depends upon there being at the
outset a cause of action upon which the corporation itself
might sue if the corporate officials were properly performing
their functions.! The following analysis shows the types of
complaint that may be the basis for an attempted derivative
suit by a stockholder:
A. When the act of which he complains is that of the
directors and is within their discretion and power to per-
'Dictum in Allen v. Montana Ref. Co., supra note 1; and see State Bank
v. Sheridan County (1924) 72 Mont. 1, 230 P. 1097; Cobb v. Lee (1927)
80 Mont. 328, 260 P. 722, in which the Allen case is cited as leading
authority on this point. But what was said in the Allen case about
stockholder's representative suits was purely dictum, the case really
turning on lack of judisdiction in the Montana Court to enter a bind-
ing decree against a foreign corporation which calls for affirmative
action in the internal affairs of the corporation. It Is the suggestion
of the court that even in a case involving fraud, application must be
made to the majority stockholders as a condition to the right to sue
representatively which is questioned herein.
C . the cases supra note 2 with the following cases that apparently
considered no demand upon the stockholders as a body to be necessary,
for it was not mentioned in them, even by way of dicta. However, it
is not clear that the court intended to state all the conditions precedent
to bringing a representative suit in any of these cases: Gerry v. Bis-
marck Bank (1897) 19 Mont. 191, 47 P. 810; Forrester v. B. & M. Min.
Co. (1898) 21 Mont. 544, 55 P. 229; McConnell v. Combination M. & M.
Co. (1904) 30 Mont. 239, 76 P. 194, 104 Am. St. Rep. 703; Brandt v.
McIntosh (1913) 47 Mont. 70, 130 P. 413; Kleinschmidt v. American
Min. Co. (1914) 49 Mont. 7, 139 P. 785; Deschamps v. Loiselle (1915)
50 Mont. 565, 148 P. 335.
'Cf. Hawes v. Oakland (1881) 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. Ed. 827; Johns v.
McLester (1902) 137 Ala. 283, 34 So. 174, 97 Am. St. Rep. 27, and an-
notation; Caldwell v. Eubanks, 8upra note 1; Continental Securities
Co. v. Belmont, supra note 1; and see note, 6 U. CHI. L. R. 269, 275.
'Cf. 13 FxmrcdE, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1932) §§5939
to 5965; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) §162; 4 CooK, CORPORATIONS
(8th ed. 1923) §§740 to 759; Corporations, 14 C. J. p. 934; 18 C. J. S.
Corporation8 §559 et 8eq.; 6 U. CHI. L. R. 269.
6Hawes v. Oakland, supra note 4; and see 13 FLETCHER, supra note 5,
§§5939, 5944; 40 WORDS AND PHRASES (Perm. ed. 1940) p. 194.
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form, his complaint being based upon disagreement over
the way things are run, clearly the complaining stockhold-
er should be entirely out of court, for in the absence of
fraud or negligence, his only recourse is to convince the
other stockholders that they ought to exert their influence
on the existing directors or elect a new board.'
B. Of a similar nature are those cases where there is a
recognized corporate right of action, but the situation is
such that the wrong complained of may be cured by a vote
of the stockholders."
C. However, where the act complained of was so wrong-
ful in nature that the majority stockholders' vote could
not cure it, application to the majority should not be
necessary when the directors refuse to act.9
D. Qualifying the rule in C are those cases in which there
is a recognized cause of action, but expediency and com-
mon sense dictate that it be disregarded."
The Montana Court fails to recognize these distinctions
in the Allen case when it says:
" ... if it be a fact that the directors were acting contrary
to the best interests of the corporation, manifestly their
duty was to oust the recalcitrant directors and elect mem-
bers who will promote and protect the company's interests
"The test usually applied by the courts is to distinguish between wrongs
void or voidable to determine whether they may be "ratified or con-
firmed" by the body of stockholders. See 6 U. CHi. L. R. 269, 270, for
a discussion on this point and a proposal to ". . . define capacity to rat-
ify in terms of possibility of a choice open to the majority to sue or
not to sue." Also see the annotation to Continental Securities Co. v.
Belmont, in 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 113. It might be said that there
really is no right to bring a representative suit when the act com-
plained of can be confirmed by the majority of the stockholders, be-
cause whatever the majority does, it is out of the complainant's
hands. Even their silence might raise an inference of acquiescence to
the director's action.
8An example is the situation that arises when the directors vote them-
selves overly large salaries. Since the majority of the stockholders
may wish to confirm this action, they should be given an opportunity
to do so before the complaining stockholder is allowed to air his griev-
ance in court. See 13 FLETCHER, supra note 5 §§5821, 5822.
'Or the facts show that it would be useless to apply to them. 4 CooK,
supra note 5, 3244. Many authorities have termed these ultra l'ire8
acts.
'For example, consider a corporate cause of action for damages against
a labor union, or a situation in which the desirability of retaining the
services of one or more of the defendants far outweighs the possible
pecuniary gain to the corporation. The majority of the stockholders
should be given an opportunity to pass upon the wisdom of the direc-
tor's action before allowing the complainant to sue. However, where
"... election not to sue would entail the surrender of valuable corpor-
ate rights without commensurate advantage to the corporation . . ."
application to the majority stockholders should not be necessary. 6
U. CHI. L. R. 269, 271, 273.
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... it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs that they appeal to
the stockholders and that they be denied relief before they
could institute this action; ... "
The court applies literally the formula generally thought con-
trolling: "a stockholder must exhaust all means of redress with-
in the corporation itself before bringing an action in the interest
of the corporation." Indeed, if such a formula is carried far
enough, none of the distinctions made supra as to the nature of
the stockholder's complaint can be recognized and he will have
difficulty in getting before the court.' An examination of the
annotation in 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 113 will show that it was in
reality an unfortunate accident that this general formula was
ever applied to cases of type C. The formula's original purpose
was to check disgruntled minorities from running to court over
disagreements on policy (see types A, B, and D), whereas later
courts seized on this handy aphorism and applied it to all deriv-
ative suits without distinction, a result which is without reason
and which has led to much of the confusion in this field today."
By far the greater number of cases involving stockholder's
derivative actions that get into court come under type C, ' and
the persuasiveness of the line of reasoning used, when the court
requires the complaining stockholder to apply for redress to the
majority stockholders as a condition to his right to sue, is en-
tirely dependent upon the effectiveness of any remedies avail-
able to the majority stockholders. As to this, it is necessary to
determine what power is reserved to the stockholders by the
Montana Code. The "relief" which the ordinary individual
stockholder may get by application to his fellow stockholders is
limited to election of a new board of directors,' removal of an
objectionable director," or institution of a representative suit by
"71 Mont. at p. 123, 227 P. at p. 587. See supra, note 2.
"There Is a class of cases, distinguishable from those under considera-
tion, where application to both the directors and the stockholders is
excused by all courts, and that is where both the directors and the ma-jority stockholders are shown by the facts to have been the wrong-
doers. See supra note 1. We may eliminate this class from our dis-
cussion, for, ". . . the law ... does not demand a request that a person
or corporation sue him or itself, nor require the doing of any useless
thing, as (a) prerequisite to the accrual of a right of action.. ." For-
rester v. B. M. Min. Co. (1898) 21 Mont. 544, 549, 55 P. 229, 231.
"Cf. cases cited supra, notes 2 and 3 with the annotations cited supra,
note 1.
"Cf. cases collected in 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 113; 72 A. L. R. 621; Cor-
porations, 14 C. J. p. 934; and 18 C. J. S. Corporations §559.
-R. C. M. 1935, §5937. It requires a majority vote to elect a director.
"R. C. M. 1935, §5940. A director may be removed by two-thirds vote
of the stockholders.
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them on behalf of the corporation,"' in the absence of charter or
by-law provisions reserving extra-ordinary and special powers
of control in the stockholders. The governing body of private
corporations in Montana is the board of directors thereof, and
this includes the power to institute suits in the corporate name.'
It should be recognized, particularly in Montana, that to
require election of a new board of directors would avail the com-
plaining stockholder nothing, considering the length of time and
expense involved in calling a general stockholder's meeting. For
this reason one writer seems to have come to the conclusion that
there need be no request to the stockholders at all as a condition
to bringing a derivative suit based upon a recognized corporate
cause of action. He says:
". .. The fact .. .that the shareholders in meeting assem-
bled cannot control the discretion of the directors in bring-
ing . . suit; that the remedy of refusing to re-elect them
involves delay, and involves the assumption that a minority
of the shareholders can by the election control such a suit;
that irreparable injury or the vesting of great financial in-
terests may occur in the meantime; and that laches may
arise as a bar to the stockholder's suit-has settled the rule
that the stockholder's request to the corporate directors to
institute the suit is sufficient."w
But, even if the minority stockholder can persuade the ma-
jority to act, it only serves to delay an action which unquestion-
ably should be started immediately.' The course of the Mon-
tana decisions up to the Allen case seem to have recognized this
fact-at least none of them went so far as to require application
1Once it is recognized that a minority stockholder has this right to bring
a representative suit, the majority stockholders should also have the
right, should they initiate it, in spite of Brandt v. McIntosh (1913) 47
Mont. 70, 130 P. 413, which held that the complainant must allege that
he was a minority stockholder before he was entitled to sue by way
of a derivative suit. Such holding can only be justified by the limited
facts present in that case. Cf. 6 U. CHI. L. R. 269, where it is sug-
gested that the majority might hire counsel and sue directly in the cor-
porate name, but citing no authority.
-R. C. M. 1935, §5933. It will readily be seen from a perusal of the
statutes that Montana law grants the stockholder little managerial
power other than this indirect power to refuse to re-elect a recalcitrant
director. As to the ineffectiveness of this power, see Continental Se-
curities Co. v. Belmont, supra note 1, 99 N. E. at p. 141, where It is said,
. ..any action by them relating to the details of the corporate busi-
ness is necessarily in the form of an assent, request, or recommenda-
tion. Recommendations by a body of stockholders can only be enforced
through the board of directors. .."
04 Coox, supra note 5, at p. 3242.
9'See note, 6 U. CHI. L. R. at p. 276, where it is said, "... The insistence
on a demand, moreover, tends only to postpone not prevent litiga-
tion. .."
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to the stockholders where there was a recognized corporate
cause of action, nor did they intimate its necessity by way of
dicta.' Consequently, the natural result of adherence to the
rule of the Allen case is to hog-tie individual stockholders, and
facilitate management without corresponding ownership, thus
making it easier for the directors and managers to avoid
being held accountable for their acts even including positive
frauds. There seems to be nothing in the common law or under
the modern law of corporations to call for such a rule."
It is submitted, then, that the court when deciding the
Allen case, should have followed the Belmont case with greater
particularity. The rule of the Belmont case, and it was so quot-
ed verbatim in the Allen case,' is as follows:
"It is the governing body or bodies of a corporation
with power to enforce a remedy to whom the complaining
stockholders must go with their demand for relief. The gov-
erning body of corporations in this state... is the board of
directors. A complaining stockholder must go to such board
for relief before he can bring an action, unless it clearly ap-
pears by the complaint that such application is useless. If
the subject matter of the stockholder's complaint is for any
reason within the immediate control, direction, or power of
confirmation of the body of stockholders it should be
brought to the attention of such stockholders for action,
before an action is commenced by a stockholder, unless it
clearly appears by the complaint that such application is
useless.'' (Italics supplied).
This rule was promulgated in the decision of a suit for an ac-
counting for fradulently and illegally issued stock and for the
dividends paid thereon, against some of the corporate directors.
The Court held that, since such issue could not be cured or rat-
ified by any number of the stockholders, the complainant had
Supra note 3. The influence of Hawes v. Oakland, supra note 4, seems
to have been considerable in the decision of the Allen case, and this is
unfortunate, in view of the interpretation which has been placed on the
Hawes case in the years since it was decided. Most courts seem to
have lost sight of the fact that the strictness of the rule adopted there,
as well as the rule of procedure governing the Federal courts (Federal
Equity Rule 23), was designed to prevent the institution of suits in the
Federal courts based on a fictitious diversity of citizenship, and not
designed to require application to the majority stockholders in all
cases.
"CJ'. Greenwood v. Union Freight Ry. Co. (1881) 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. Ed.
961; Brewer v. Boston Theater (1870) 104 Mass. 378; Shaw v. Staight(1909) 107 Minn. 152, 119 N. W. 951, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1077; Gregory
v. Patchett (1864) 33 Beav. 595; and see 4 CooK, supra note 5, 3242;
13 FLETCHER, 8upra note 5, §5964.
2371 Mont. at p. 123, 227 P. at p. 587.
"Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 8upra note 1, 99 N. E. at p. 142.
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no duty whatever to appeal to them, before instituting a repre-
sentative suit. Close study of the quoted rule will show sub-
stantial conformity to the analysis made supra, and it seems that
the rule advanced is supported by both better reasoning and au-
thority.' The Montana court should adopt it for future cases,
the situation being approached from the standpoint of what
would be equitable to both ownership and management, rather
than what seems to be a questionable tendency to favor manage-
ment by placing unnecessary conditions on the right of a stock-
holder to institute a representative suit.
-Grover C. Schmidt, Jr.
DAMAGES: THE DOCTRINE OF REBITTITUR
IN MONTANA
After finding by the Supreme Court that defendant is
entitled to a new trial because of excessive damages' the doctrine
of remittitur permits the court to compel him to forgo that right
provided that plaintiff accepts a reduced verdict.' The doctrine
came into use as a means of eliminating the expense and dilatory
process of repeated trials and in many instances there can be
24 CooK, supra note 5, §740 et seq.
'Remittitur is also applied by the trial courts, and its use therein is
universally upheld. Bull v. Butte Electric Railway Co. (1924) 69
Mont. 529, 223 P. 514; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Herbert (1885)
116 U. S. 642, 29 L. Ed. 755, 6 S. Ct. 590; Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann
(1888) 130 U. S. 69, 39 L. Ed. 854, 9 S. Ct. 458. No attempt is made
in this comment to deal with this aspect of the doctrine.
2Though increscitur (increasing amount of the damages) is much less
frequently indulged in than remittitur, it has been followed in some
jurisdictions. McCoRMciK, DAMAGES (1935) §19 at p. 82 and cases
there cited. In Dimick v. Schiedt (1935) 93 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296,
79 L. Ed. 603, 95 A. L. R. 1150, the Supreme Court of the United
States prohibited increscitur in any event. Mr. Justice Stone wrote a
strong disenting opinion, which was concurred in by three other Jus-
tices, In which he pointed out that it is altogether inconsistent on prin-
ciple to utilize remttitur without recognizing inorescitur.
'The doctrine is most frequently stated in terms of the plaintiff's ac-
ceptance of a reduced verdict in lieu of demanding a new trial, whereas
the defendant is compelled to accept the judgment of the appellate
court. 20 R. C. L., New Trial, §99; 54 C. J. REMImTrru p. 108.
Compulsory remittitur has been denied in both this country and Eng-
land. Kennon v. Gilmer (1885) 5 Mont. 257, 5 P. 847; (1888) 131
U. S. 22, 33 L. Ed. 110. 9 S. Ct. 696. This decision was followed in
Kennon v. Gilmer (1889) 9 Mont. 108, 22 P. 448. See also, Watt v.
Watt (1905) House of Lords, A. C. 115, 2 Am. & Eng. Cases 672;
McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES (1935) §19; 4 SEDGwiCK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) §1330.
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